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ABSTRACT 
In February 1982, Syrian President Assad’s military and security forces 
surrounded, assaulted, and leveled the fourth largest city in Syria, Hama, killing between 
5,000-25,000 Syrians in less than three weeks.  It was the culmination of an escalating 
five year revolutionary war between the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and President Hafez 
Assad’s authoritarian rule.  Through the use of overwhelming force and a government 
sponsored moderate Islamification process, the Muslim Brotherhood was transformed 
from a violent revolutionary opposition movement to a peace oriented social organization 
calling for a representative democratic government.  
Using Social Movement Theory (SMT) and Dr. McCormick’s Mystic Diamond, 
this thesis demonstrates how extreme state violence affects opposition social movements.  
It analyzes why the Muslim Brotherhood’ s revolution failed, why the Assad regime 
succeeded, and how its overwhelming defeat transformed the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood from a violent revolutionary organization to a peaceful social movement.  
The Syrian counter-insurgency model provides a viable strategy that can be applied to 
existing and future insurgencies throughout the Middle East. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Hafez al-Assad was not the intrinsically evil man that his domestic 
enemies portrayed him to be; his private life was beyond reproach and his 
patriotism was real if self-centered.  His understanding of the functioning 
of political power and his knowledge of human weakness was outstanding.  
He had given Syria its first prolonged period of stability since its 
independence and he naturally identified himself with this achievement.  
Any serious opposition to his leadership was thus an act of treachery, a 
betrayal of the Arab Socialist Baath party, of the Syrian leadership and the 
Syrian people.1 
A. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ITS ORIGINS AND ROLE IN SYRIA 
To understand how the Assad regime affected the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, it 
is important to understand how the Brotherhood developed prior to 1977.  In this chapter, 
the origins of the Brotherhood and its deteriorating relationship with the various Syrian 
governments are briefly outlined.  A critical concept is that the Muslim Brotherhood was 
a social organization determined to create an Islamic society as opposed to a one 
dimensional bomb-throwing group of terrorists.  It wanted to provide all of the social 
services normally reserved for a government under the banner of the Shari’a.  Initially, 
this campaign was relatively peaceful but became increasingly violent as the Syrian 
governments grew more authoritarian and less tolerant of opposition groups. The counter-
insurgency lessons learned from the Syria example are not applicable to most situations 
in which a state’s use of extreme violence is insufficient to end an insurgency. Assad’s 
ability to exploit the organizational vulnerabilities of the Muslim Brotherhood was the 
critical element in Syria’s ability to mold the Brotherhood.  In essence, Syria’s victory 
was as much about the Brotherhood’s organizational vulnerabilities as it was Assad’s 
successful counter-insurgency strategy.  This chapter “sets the stage”, demonstrating how 
the Brotherhood reluctantly developed into a violent revolutionary group committed to a 
zero sum war with the authoritarian Assad regime. 
                                                 
1 Robert Fisk, Pity the nation, (Oxford, University press, 2001), 178. 
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The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna.  
One of the core beliefs of the Muslim Brotherhood was “Political Islam”2 which is the 
integration of the tenets of Islam into the government, its laws, and into the daily life of 
Arabs.  This Islamic law is called the Shari’a and is a basic foundation of Islamic 
fundamentalism.  The Muslim Brotherhood espoused that “the Koran was our 
constitution.”3  While it did not initially conflict with Pan-Arab nationalism (1920s-30s), 
it later became a counter to regimes that promoted nationalism such as Nasser’s Egypt 
and Assad’s Syria.4  The Islamic nature of the Brotherhood’s beliefs opposed the secular 
ideologies held by many Middle Eastern nations, specifically those colonized by the 
European powers.  As the decades passed, secular Arab regimes that didn’t embrace 
Islam as their guiding force eventually ended up at odds with the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The Muslim Brotherhood first appeared in Syria in the 1930s.  Students studying 
in Egypt returned to Syria “inspired by the ideology of Hassan al-Banna”.5  Since a solid 
majority of Syrian citizens were Sunni Muslims, the Muslim Brotherhood’s message had 
a significant audience on which to build its organizational foundation.  The returning 
students created a loose network of Muslim Brotherhood organizations throughout Syria; 
one of the first being in Aleppo as the party headquarters in 1935.  In the 1930s, 1940s 
and most of the 1950s, the Brotherhood was not viewed as a direct threat to the Syrian 
government, more as an annoyance.   
Originally, the Syrian Brotherhood focused on reforming civic and social 
programs in Syria.  However, two changes occurred that radicalized the Brotherhood in 
Syria during the 1950s.  First, the creation of Israel was seen as a direct threat to the 
principles of the Brotherhood.6  How can you have an Islamic Arab region with Israel in 
                                                 
2 “Al-Qa’ida: Back to the Future The Vanguard and Muslim Brotherhood Operations in Syria.”  
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.  Webpage online.  Available from 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq_syria.asp;  Internet accessed 15 May 2006.  
3 Professor Glen E. Robinson lecture, Low Intensity Conflict in the Middle East course at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, 26 April 2006. 
4 Robinson lecture, 26 April 2006. 
5 “Muslim Brotherhood – Syria Timeline.” Encyclopedia of the Orient. Webpage online.    Available 
from http://i-cias.com/e.o/mus_br_syria.htm ; Internet; accessed 15 May 2006. 1. 
6 “Muslim Brotherhood – Syria Timeline.”, 1. 
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existence?  This issue politicized the Brotherhood’s beliefs and made the organization 
more radical.   The second was the influx of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood members 
fleeing the Egyptian government and resettling in Syria.7  The Egyptians feared that the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was becoming a “state within a state”.8  In the mid-1950s, 
the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Nasser.  The assassination attempt and 
other ongoing insurgent operations lead to a massive crackdown on the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, forcing many of its members to flee to Syria.  This influx of 
radicalized Brotherhood members into the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood network further 
radicalized the organization.  Because of these issues, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 
looked much different in the late 1950s as opposed to the early 1940s.  This fact was not 
lost on the Syrian government which banned the Brotherhood in 1958 forcing the 
network underground.  As in all politics, the winds of change favored the Brotherhood in 
1961 when Syria left the United Arab Republic (UAR) and 10 members of the 
Brotherhood were elected to parliament.9  For a fleeting moment, it looked like the 
Muslim Brotherhood had a legitimate avenue to affect change in the Syrian government.  
That spark of hope was extinguished two years later in a Baathist coup. 
B. THE RISE AND IRON RULE OF PRESIDENT ASSAD 
In the 1950s and 1960s, Syria developed its identity as a nation.  From a domestic 
standpoint, the nationalist focus of the Syrian government offended the religious based 
opposition organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood.  This was further exacerbated in 
the mid-1960s when the secular Baathist party overthrew the existing government in a 
coup d’etat.  After their coup, the Baathist government banned the Muslim Brotherhood 
and all other political opposition parties.  The small political foothold that the Muslim 
Brotherhood had established two years earlier in the parliamentary elections was lost;  
                                                 
7 “Al-Qa’ida: Back to the Future The Vanguard and Muslim Brotherhood Operations in Syria.”, 6. 
8 “Al-Qa’ida: Back to the Future The Vanguard and Muslim Brotherhood Operations in Syria”, 5.  
9 “Muslim Brotherhood – Syria Timeline”, 1.  
 4
their voice in the legitimate political arena was extinguished. This was the first salvo in a 
small fire fight that would escalate into the “total war” scenario executed in Hama almost 
two decades later. 
1967 was a watershed year for Arab politics.  The total Arab defeat in the 1967 
war with Israel signaled the end of Pan-Arab nationalism in the region.10  Nasser’s dream 
of an Arab-unified region was dealt a fatal blow.  In Syria, the shock waves were felt as 
the country reeled in its military’s defeat at the hand of the Zionists.  Syria had embraced 
the concept of Arab-nationalism and was forced to re-examine its future identity.  During 
this time, the Muslim brotherhood split into moderates and radicals.  The radicals called 
for a “Jihad on the Baath party leadership”.11  In the radical’s minds, defeat at the hands 
of the Zionists was blasphemous.  The only answer was an Islamic government by any 
means available. 
It was in these chaotic times (there was a reported 50 coup attempts from 1948-
7012) that Hafez al-Assad came to power in November, 1970.  As a career military officer 
and political leader in the military, he was put in charge of the air force after the Baathist 
coup and was later appointed as the Defense Minister.  Assad became disillusioned with 
the current Baathist government because he believed that Syria should have intervened in 
the Black September War between the Palestinians and the Jordanians.13  Because of this, 
Assad executed his bloodless coup and took power in Syria.   
Assad was an Alawite, a “sect of Islam that believed in the divinity of Ali with 
many secret and even Christian-like tenets” that Sunni Muslims felt were “Muslim-
heretics or secular radicals.” 14 The fact that an Alawite was in charge of Syria as an 
authoritarian ruler did not sit well with the Muslim Brotherhood, especially with a 
majority Sunni population.  Assad recognized that he, being an Alawite, strengthened the 
                                                 
10 Robinson, discussion, 24 April 2006. 
11 “Muslim Brotherhood – Syria Timeline.”, 1. 
12 Ibid., 1. 
13  “Hafez al-Assad.” Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.  2 March 2006.  Webpage online.  Available 
from     http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hama_massacre ; Internet accessed 1 June 2006. 
14 Thomas Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York, Farrar Straus Giroux, 1989) 78. 
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cause of the Muslim Brotherhood and created many new enemies.  In an extremely 
shrewd political move, Assad used one of the most influential Shia theologians, Imam 
Musa al-Sadr’s proclamation that Alawites were Shia Muslims.  To support this, Assad 
took a well publicized “umra”, or trip to Mecca to show his spirituality.15   This 
“greening of the government”16 calmed the growing Islamist storm for a few years.  
During this stable time period, Assad continued to strengthen his administration by filling 
virtually all positions in his government with trusted Alawite personnel.  He instituted a 
strong police-state presence that controlled the population.  Unlike his very heavy-handed 
peer, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Assad used threats and bribes as a way to deal with his 
political opposition parties, saving the “iron fist” as a last resort. 
The time period of uneasy calm exploded in July 1976 when the Syrian 
government supported the Maronite Christians in the Lebanese Civil war.  This was the 
final straw for the Muslim Brotherhood and a jihad was called for to topple the Assad 
regime.17  At this point, the Assad regime had been established and set for over five 
years.  Assad had solid control of the lethal and well oiled Syrian security apparatus 
consisting of the military, a powerful secret police and overt police force, and the other 
governmental offices that provided services and security for the people of Syria. 
As 1977 broke, Syria stood divided between a committed Assad regime and a 
Muslim Brotherhood that truly believed they were on the divine path to victory.  Assad 
saw himself as Syria and all opposition parties as treacherous entities that needed to be 
wiped out.  Thomas Friedman quotes Rifaat, Hafez’s brother and elite military 
commander, as saying he “pledged to fight a hundred wars, demolish a million 
strongholds, and sacrifice a million martyrs.”18  This “zero-sum game” mindset was 
shared by both Assad brothers.  All opposition to their rule had to be obliterated at any 
cost. 
                                                 
15 “Muslim Brotherhood – Syria Timeline.”, 1. 
16 Professor Vali Nasr’s classroom discussion in his Islamic Fundamentalism class at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, 27 November 2006.  
17 “Muslim Brotherhood – Syria Timeline.” 1.   
18 Friedman, 79.  
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From the 1930s to 1976, Syria had a turbulent relationship with the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  That changed drastically as the next five years from 1977-1982 built into a 
steady crescendo of blood, violence, and death.  This gruesome cacophony crested in 
Hama, shrieking its loudest before being totally silenced by the Assad government.  40 
years later, Assad’s Alawite government still controls Syria while the Brotherhood 
operates from exile.   
The next chapter utilizes Social Movement Theory (SMT) to create a case study 
of the Muslim Brotherhood from 1977 to 1982.  This case study will be compared to the 
1995-present Syrian Muslim brotherhood case study (chapter 4) to analyze the effects of 
Assad’s use of extreme state violence against the Muslim Brotherhood.  Using these case 
studies, the thesis will analysis how this state violence changed the Brotherhood from a 
violent revolutionary organization to a peace oriented social movement that calls for a 
representative Syrian government.  It will demonstrate that authoritarian state violence is 
a viable option for contemporary states struggling with Islamic insurgencies. 
 7
II. SMT ANALYSIS OF THE SYRIAN MUSLIM 
BROTHERHOOD 1977-1982: EXPOSING THE 
BROTHERHOOD’S CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES 
Their demands appeared in anonymous wall posters; in Aleppo in 1980 for 
example, the Organizations of Ulemas of Aleppo’ demanded a 
commitment to the Sharia [Islamic law] in all legislation”, an end to the 
state of emergency in Syria, the release of all detainees, the reinstatement 
of all university teachers who had lost their job because of their political 
views, an end to misleading “propaganda” and “total freedom”.  19 
Social movement theory (SMT)20 provides an outstanding mechanism to analyze 
the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood as a social organization and to understand its 
revolutionary evolution.  Three common variables used by SMT are political opportunity 
structures, mobilizing structures and cultural framing21.  The first variable, political 
opportunity structures22, analyzes any political change, domestic or international, that 
creates new or ignites existing social activism.  The second variable, mobilizing 
structures23, analyzes the formal and informal framework of the organization.  In this 
case, the goal of this variable is to explain, in detail, how the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 
was organized and operated.  The third variable, cultural framing24, takes into 
consideration all of the unique cultural aspects of a society and how it defines the social 
movement.  What are the critical aspects of a culture’s identity and particular way of life 
that drives the ideology of a social movement?   
This chapter creates a case study capturing the Brotherhood’s organizational 
existence from 1977-1982. In Chapter V, this case study will be compared to the SMT 
1995-present Syrian Muslim brotherhood case study (Chapter IV) to demonstrate the 
                                                 
19 Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation  Lebanon at War (Oxford: University Press, 2001), 181. 
20 Quintan Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism (Bloomington: Indiana University press, 2004), 4. 
21 Glenn E. Robinson, “Hamas as a Social Movement” in Islamic Activism (Bloomington: Indiana 
University press, 2004), 116. 
22 Wiktorowicz, 13.  
23 Wiktorowicz,  9. 
24 Wiktorowicz, 15. 
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effects of Syria’s authoritarian government on the Brotherhood. The focus of this chapter 
is the application of the SMT framework to the 1977-1982 Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 
with a goal of understanding the organization, its strategy, and its beliefs. The Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood was not a “one-trick” bomb throwing terrorist group, nor was it an 
active government.  It was a social organization that mobilized itself as an opposition 
force to an authoritarian government.  The SMT framework offers the appropriate 
analytical lens to separate the organization into its parts to gain understanding of the 
Brotherhood as a whole.  By analyzing these three SMT variables and how they apply to 
the Muslim Brotherhood, the fractured nature of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s 
organization and lack of a unified revolutionary strategy becomes apparent.  These 
vulnerabilities became targets for the application of extreme state violence by the Assad 
regime and led to the demise of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. 
A. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
The variable, political opportunity structures, analyzes the environment in which 
the social organization exists.  It focuses on the particular changes in that environment 
which create opportunity for the social movement.  These small to large changes have the 
potential to set off a chain of events that can motivate a social movement into action.25 
There were four major instances of external political change that created political 
opportunity which directly affected the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.  First, a minority 
Alawite (sect of Shia) government took control of the Syrian government and ruled with 
an iron fist.    The second variable that changed the political opportunity structure was the 
absolute defeat of the Syrians / Pan-Arabists by the Israelis in the 1967. The third 
variable, and most explosive for the Brotherhood, was the Syrian support of the 
Christians against Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian guerillas in the 1976 Lebanese war26.  The 
fourth variable was the revolutionary example set by the Iranians in their 1979 revolution 
                                                 
25 Discussion from Professor Glenn E. Robinson’s Jihadi Information Strategies course, the Naval 
Postgraduate School, 16 October 2006. 
26Sami Moubayed, The History of Political and Militant Islam in Syria. Webpage online. Available 
from http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369768 ; Internet accessed 22 November 
2006. 
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against the Shah’s government.  These four instances of political opportunity structures 
ignited the revolutionary spirit of the existing Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.   
1. Alawite Minority Rule, the Heavy Iron Fist 
In Syria, the Alawite minority’s secular rule over the Sunni majority was defined 
by an authoritarian state in which opposition was not tolerated.  Ali Sadreddine 
Bayanouni, a veteran of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s campaign against the Assad 
regime and current head of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (in exile) described living 
under Assad.  
The brutality of the Syrian regime, and its willingness to use conventional 
military capabilities against its own civilian population, is unparalleled in 
modern history. They detained over 60,000 people in that period. 27     
Under authoritarian regimes, opposition groups rarely get a political platform 
(elected officials, political parties) to represent their causes and voice their beliefs.28  In 
Syria’s case, the only avenue to affect change left to the Brotherhood was violence and 
revolution.  In a sense, Assad’s government set the conditions for violent opposition by 
not giving the Islamic fundamentalists an avenue to express their issues in a non-violent 
political manner. 
The Assad government declared total war against the Brotherhood after a failed 
assassination attempt against President Assad in June, 1980.  In July 1980, Assad passed 
law No. 49 which made being a member in the Muslim brotherhood a capital offense 
punishable by death.29  The next 20 months were defined by each side anteing up their 
violence until one side collapsed.  Overall, the oppressive nature of the Syrian political 
environment in the late 1970s was a key instance of the political opportunity structure 
variable.   
                                                 
27 The Battle Within Syria: An Interview with Muslim Brotherhood Leader Ali Sadr al-Din al-
Bayanouni” Webpage online.   http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0604/0604_2.htm; accessed 25 
November 2006. 
28 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press), 67. 
29 Moubayed, 2.  
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2. The 1967 Pan-Arab Defeat  
The Israeli victory over the Pan-Arab forces, led by Nasser’s Egypt, was the death 
knell of Pan-Arabism.   Prior to this defeat, the Pan-Arab countries laid out their Arabist 
vision for the Arab region in which they sold their “new Arab world” vision based on two 
promises.30  The first promise was to “free the region of European controls, influence, 
and economics”.31  Israel was the ultimate European intrusion and must be dealt with as 
destroying Israel would liberate Arab lands.  In the Pan-Arabist view, the Europeans had 
no right to carve up the Middle East as they had post-WWI.  The second promise stated 
that “the Arab world would empower the population and provide great social support 
services to create a great future.”32  The new Arab world concept called for a great 
liberation, empowered Arab populations, and education and wealth for all of the Arab 
populations.   The 1967 defeat demonstrated that the two core promises of the Pan-Arab 
movement were unattainable visions of grandeur.   The reality was secular authoritarian 
governments that failed to provide many basic social services for its population.33  The 
world seemingly progressed while the Arab nations fell behind in all social categories. 
While this defeat happened before Assad took power, he inherited a government 
that completely bought into the ideas of Pan-Arabism.  Israel’s decisive and stunningly 
quick victory was a complete embarrassment for all of the Arabs involved.  The second 
promise of strong social services and a utopian Arab empire did not come to pass either.  
Instead, there was a minority oppressive authoritarian government that empowered a 
minority at the expense of the majority.  The defeat of 1967 became a rallying cry for 
Jihadi organizations everywhere that the Pan-Arabists and Nasserites were not following 
God’s will.  This key defeat proved to be a critical instance of political opportunity for 
the Brotherhood in Syria. 
                                                 
30 Discussion from Professor Vali Nasr’s Islamic Fundamentalism course at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, 6 November 2006. 
31 Nasr, 6 November 2006. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Class discussion by Glenn E. Robinson’s Low Intensity Conflict in the Middle East, at NPS, 19 
April 2006.  
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3. 1976 War in Lebanon 
This political opportunity proved to be the pivotal action that spurred the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood into an all out revolutionary struggle with the Assad regime.  When 
the Muslim communities and Christians fought in the 1976 Lebanese civil war, Assad 
sent in troops supporting the Christians.  This provoked absolute outrage from the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood. Unlike the previous decades of various injustices, the Brotherhood 
felt this was the “final straw” and that there was no other option outside of total regime 
change through revolution.34  As noted in the last chapter, Assad had assuage some of his 
Islamic critics by getting the religious backing of  a leading Shiite, Imam Musa al-Sadr 
and taking a “umra”, or trip to Mecca to seem more Islamic.35  However, the thin green 
coat of paint was washed away by his support of the Christians over the Palestinians.  
From this point, the violence between the Brotherhood and the Syrian government 
increased until the Brotherhood’s destruction in 1982.   
This variable ties in well with the 1967 defeat when the Brotherhood made their 
religious cultural framing messages.  The support of the Christians was an easy target for 
the Jihadi to say “see, they aren’t supporting our Islamic Brothers.  In fact, they are 
actively opposing them, much like they oppose the Syrian Sunnis.”  These political 
events gave the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood the “moral high-ground” to attack the 
secular government.  This righteous indignation would prove to be the rallying cry for the 
Brotherhood (see cultural framing below). 
4. The Iranian Revolution 
When the Shah’s regime was shattered by the Iranian Shia’s revolution (1979), 
the reverberations were felt worldwide.  Islamic revolution discourse became a common 
debate both domestically and internationally.  The Iranian revolution was one of the great 
revolutions of modern history.  It was on par with the Russian, American, and French 
revolutions.  It served as an example of what could be achieved if the religious majority 
                                                 
34 Moubayed,  1. 
35 “Muslim Brotherhood – Syria Timeline.” Encyclopedia of the Orient. Webpage Online.  Available 
from: http://i-cias.com/e.o/mus_br_syria.htm; internet accessed 10 December 2006. 
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was mobilized.  The months following the revolution saw some of Syria’s bloodiest 
fighting.  This marked increase of the Brotherhood’s violence was highlighted by the 
brutal attack on the artillery school in Aleppo.36    While the Iranian revolution happened 
many years into the internal Syrian struggles, it proved that Islamic revolution was 
possible and that the Muslim Brotherhood could succeed.   
These four instances of external political change directly led to opportunities that 
defined the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.  In particular, the oppressive authoritarian 
characteristics of the minority Alawite regime set the conditions for a violent opposition 
social movement.  The 1967 war, the 1976 Lebanese civil war and the Iranian revolution 
all acted as accelerants in the raging fire between the Brotherhood and the Assad regime.  
Though political opportunity structures provide an analysis of the environment in which 
the social movement grew, the critical details that explain why the Brotherhood was 
unsuccessful lie in the mobilizing structures variable. 
B.  MOBILIZING STRUCTURES 
From the 1930s to the late 1950s, Syria’s Muslim brotherhood was a loose 
network of hubs, primarily focused in north western Syria around the Aleppo and Hama 
regions.  The initial network was based on family and tribal ties utilizing local mosques 
and communities as their structures37.  From the 1960s to 1982, the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood network militarized itself as it developed into the main opposition group 
opposing Syria’s secular rule.  Using the mobilizing structure variable as a lens of 
analysis, the four major aspects of the Brotherhood’s network analyzed are the 1. 
physical layout of the network, 2. the strategy utilized by the network, 3. its leadership, 
and 4. its information operations concept.  From this analysis, a clear picture of the 
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s organization and operational concept is captured.  It will 
answer the key question of what organizational flaws prevented the Brotherhood from 
achieving success.  This analysis also demonstrates how an authoritarian government can 
exploit the weaknesses of an insurgent network design. 
                                                 
36 Muslim Brotherhood – Syria Timeline, 1. 
37 Nasr, 30 October 2006 Classroom Discussion. 
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1. The Layout of the Network 
The physical layout of the Muslim Brotherhood’s network was established four 
decades prior to the incredible violence of the late 1970s.  Each region in Syria (i.e. 
Aleppo, Hama, Damascus, etc.) had their own distinctive organization and leadership.  
Each adapted to the needs and demands of their particular area.  For the most part, the 
Muslim Brotherhood was moderate in their response to what they perceived as social 
outrages.  However, various violent outbursts against the secular regimes forced the 
Brotherhood into a networked organization of hubs and cells.  This organizational 
framework provided a decentralized structure that offered protection and anonymity for 
its members.  This protection came at the expense of reliable and timely communications. 
But during the 1940s to early 1960s, there wasn’t a direct threat to the Brotherhood, so 
the networked approach was never really challenged.  However, that all changed when 
the secular Ba’athists took power in 1963 and subsequently banned political opposition 
groups, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s network, which was primarily based in urban centers, 
used secrecy to coordinate and rebel against the Syrian government.  This network used 
mosques and social networks (family and tribal ties) to mobilize opposition to the 
regimes.  Each region’s hub had a leader that coordinated the actions within his area.  
However, each region’s hubs and cells had different priorities and agendas (i.e. power 
struggles, political capital, controlling social services, etc.).  While these differences 
seemed a minor inconvenience in the group’s agreed upon fight against the Ba’athists in 
the 1960s, it became the Achilles heel during the fighting in the late 1970s, early 1980s.38 
The Muslim Brotherhood used existing organizational structures to build and hide 
their cells.  After their coup, the Ba’athists took in a large influx of Syrians into their 
party and government apparatus.  The Brotherhood took advantage of this mass 
recruitment and infiltrated numerous members throughout the Ba’ath party, specifically 
                                                 
38 “Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities (Study of the 
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood against the Assad Regime)” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.  
Webpage Online.  Available from http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq_600080.asp; Internet accessed 26 
November 2006. 
 14
the education system.  Using the education system, the Brotherhood was able to influence 
the youth and young adult Syrians.  This proved to be an effective recruitment and 
mobilization tool.39 
 
Figure 1.   The Muslim Brotherhood Network, 1977-1982 
 
 
While the Muslim Brotherhood had its network of hubs and cells in Syria, it relied 
heavily on support from the international Muslim Brotherhood and similar Sunni Islamic 
groups outside of the country, particularly Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine.  The Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood was not building its own weapons or printing its own money, 
therefore, logistical and military support had to come from these outside sources.40  
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However, this support came with strings attached.  As will become apparent in the 
leadership and strategy sections, accepting this necessary support meant giving up a 
certain amount of command and control.  By 1977, the Brotherhood was totally 
dependent on foreign aid to fund and sustain their fight.41  On a positive note, outside 
assistance did provide the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood with a sanctuary when things 
became too dangerous for them inside of Syria.  From this sanctuary, future strategy and 
outside fundraising was accomplished to support the field commanders in Syria. 
Key flaws existed in the Brotherhood’s physical organizational layout. The fact 
that each regional hub and their cells were focused on different priorities was never 
reconciled prior to the 1976 uprising.  The reliance on outside support also meant that 
operations inside Syria would only be as good as their logistical support.  Without a 
stockpile of equipment, weapons, and ammunition pre-positioned before a state-wide 
uprising, the fight would always be a slave to its external masters.  These flaws can be 
directly attributed to the inability of a network to stockpile large amounts of equipment or 
a poor strategy and questionable leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood leading up to 
February, 1982. 
2. The Command and Control Structure and Strategy 
The decentralized nature of a networked approach to revolution has many 
inherent structural challenges.42  For a network to run efficiently, de-centralized control 
must be given to the hubs and cells with an overall and well understood strategy.  
Unfortunately for the Muslim Brotherhood, an overall synchronized strategy didn’t exist.  
All of the Islamic opposition groups agreed the Assad regime needed to go, but no agreed 
upon plan was ever reached.  Their strategy, or lack thereof, must be analyzed by what 
their objectives were, how they executed their operations, what was the logistical plan, 
and exactly who was controlling the revolution in Syria. 
                                                 
41 Harmony, 7. 
42 Discussion from Professor Erik Jansen’s Organizational Design course, the Naval Postgraduate 
School, 3 April 2006. 
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There were no clear objectives set forth by the Muslim Brotherhood to mobilize 
the Syrian masses.  Without these clear objectives, a coordinated plan could not be 
disseminated to the field commanders and the individual fighters on the Syrian streets.  In 
their after action report, the Brotherhood noted: 
The Mujahideen failed to define their identity, their intentions and 
motivations; such an explanation was and still is the main pillar for 
attracting the masses and mobilizing the base members on an intellectual 
and ideological level to partake in this dangerous work (i.e. Jihad).43  
 Without these clearly define objectives (and a charismatic leader to sell them), 
the Muslim Brotherhood could not effectively mobilize the masses.  Without the full 
support of the Syrian masses focused on core objectives, the Brotherhood could not 
generate a legitimate revolution.  This was a critical flaw that doomed their revolution. 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy focused its fight on Syria’s urban centers, 
particularly Aleppo, Hama, and Damascus.  Unfortunately, they failed to mobilize other 
key groups in the country under one Islamic banner.  Rural groups, especially, the Kurds 
and Bedouins were not utilized to control the rural areas between the cities and facilitate 
logistics.44  Also, there was a large Muslim Brotherhood nation outside of Syria that 
could have brought thousands of fighters into Syria as well as tens of millions of dollars 
of support if properly mobilized.45  None of these potential assets were utilized which 
gave Assad’s forces free reign in the rural areas, the ability to surround cities (i.e. Hama), 
and the capability to strangle the Brotherhood’s logistical support flow. 
Another fatal flaw in the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy was logistical support to 
their military operations (see below chart).  The strategy failed to anticipate the amount 
of weapons, and equipment needed to execute a successful revolution.  The numerous 
skirmishes, battles, and losses from 1963 to 1979 drained the existing resources of the 
organization in Syria.  It relied on foreign aid to support its on-going and future 
operations.  The key problem was that logistics began to dictate the flow of battle.  Those 
                                                 
43 Harmony, 6. 
44 Harmony, 7. 
45 Harmony, 13. 
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outside of the country that were supplying the logistics, specifically Syrian exiles, began 
to make strategic decisions.  This action took the battlefield command away from the 
field commanders that were fighting the actual battles in Syria.  This crippled decision 
making in the field as they were beholden to those providing support from afar.  Also, it 
created a centralized leadership system in a decentralized framework which slowed and 
degraded all critical communications, strategies, and coordination with other elements.  
Ultimately, this inefficient command and control structure crushed the field commander’s 
initiative and ability to wage substantial revolutionary warfare. 
3. Leadership Structure 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership bears the brunt of its failure in Syria.  Its 
failed strategy, poor command and control structure, and tremendously poor leadership 
skills, particularly at the highest levels, created an environment in which disaster was 
assured.  During the decades of fighting (1960s-82), many of the Brotherhood’s 
leadership escaped to Jordan or Iraq and attempted to lead from afar in an environment 
far removed from the realities of the Syrian street. To make matters worse, the 
Brotherhood in Syria was a “rule by committee” structure which couldn’t agree on 
anything.   A scathing Jihadi after action report (AAR) noted:   
A war council was created to address the siege of Hama two to three 
months prior to the all out war; this council consisted of forty members (a 
weird mixture of religious sheiks, civilian leaders, and youthful cadres); 
those incompatible members, involved in a power struggle, were unable to 
agree on a single point, each group pulling in a different direction…46   
This type of centralized committee “leadership” canceled out the quick and 
responsive characteristics of the de-centralized network structure.  Because of this, the 
Brotherhood’s leadership structure created an unresponsive system that did not react 
quickly when events occur.   
 
                                                 
46 Harmony, 14. 
 18
 
Figure 2.   The Muslim Brotherhood’s Leadership Paradigm 
 
The personalities of these leaders and their inability to unite the various factions 
of the Muslim Brotherhood proved a lethal combination.  Marwaan Hadeed, an early 
leader (mid 1960s) in the movement was a charismatic personality that tried to unite the 
Brotherhood.  The Assad regime captured, tortured and killed him in 1975.47  While his 
death served as a call for operational secrecy, the organization did not train follow on 
leaders that were capable of handling his mantle of leadership.48  Instead of focusing 
power by experience or qualifications in the organization, it was an individual’s charisma 
and power that members gravitated towards.  When leaders were killed or removed, a 
power struggle ensued rather than a position in the organization being filled with a 
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trained qualified replacement.  To make matters worse, the open-door recruitment policy 
of the Brotherhood did a very poor job of vetting recruits.  This allowed inadequate 
candidates to take leadership positions and also allowed Syrian agents to infiltrate some 
of the Brotherhood’s cells.  By not putting the right leader in the right position, the 
Brotherhood was unable to fix the problems of infighting, political agendas and 
personality conflicts that kept the organization at the gang-land tactical level. 49 
Another key issue was the mass exodus of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s high 
ranking leadership to Jordan and Iraq to avoid capture and death in Syria.  Their original 
plan was to re-group, re-organize and infiltrate back into Syria.  This never happened.  
They stayed in exile which proved to be a large operational blunder.50  These “leaders” 
were under the assumption that they could lead the battle from exile.  From Iraq and 
Jordan, they attempted to give orders and directives without being anywhere near the 
tactical situation.  They maintained power by controlling the influx of much need 
supplies and weapons but failed to tap into the large reservoir of money and fighters 
available from the other Muslim Brotherhoods in the region.  These leaders in exile were 
“talking the talk, but not walking the walk.”  As was pointed out in the Jihadists AAR:  
It is astonishing to see and hear leaders of Muslim organizations preaching 
jihad and claiming that dying for “Allah” is their ultimate wish, yet they 
fail for ten years to instruct religiously and train militarily for the 
fight….51 
 
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leadership failed time and again to create a 
strategy for their campaigns against the various Syrian governments.  They did not 
mobilize the readily available resources of the rural population, international Muslim 
brotherhood fighters and monetary support, or create a unified strategy with the existing 
opposition groups that shared their same revolutionary vision. Prior to 1977, they had 
decades to resolve these inter-organizational differences and create a unified strategy. 
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50 Harmony, 8. 
51 Harmony, 11. 
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However, they were overcome by their own personal goals and priorities and failed to 
create unity.  The Brotherhood was a group of unsynchronized hubs attempting to topple 
a coordinated authoritarian government. 
4. Muslim Brotherhood’s Information Operations Structure 
One of the keys to a successful revolution is to mobilize the masses through a 
succinct message that captures the heart of the revolutions message.52  While the message 
itself will be analyzed in the next section, “cultural framing”, the Brotherhood’s 
communication mechanisms are analyzed for their strengths and weaknesses.  In a time 
period of government controlled newspapers and TV stations, the battle of the message 
was fought outside the traditional means of the mass media.  What means did the 
opposition groups use to reach its audience to spread its message and mobilize its 
population? 
One of the key strengths enjoyed by the Brotherhood was the fact that the 
population was over 75% Sunni while the ruling class was a small minority sect of Shia 
Islam.  The Iranian revolution showed that this state wide network of mosques and 
Islamic schools were the perfect means for communicating and coordinating a revolution.  
Of course, in an authoritarian state, secrecy and discretion were the difference between 
freedom or jail (or death).     
The education system proved a strong communication mechanism.  This was a 
fantastic means for indoctrination into Islamic fundamentalism.  The education system 
was a critical part of a mobilizing mechanism to rally the Sunni masses when overt 
revolution was on hand.  As a result, the system of schools and mosques were crucial 
mobilizing mechanisms for spreading the revolutionary message in the Brotherhood’s 
war from 1977-1982. 
There was a fundamental flaw in this mobilizing system: there was no unified 
Syrian Sunni message.  Reflecting their regional opposition group counterparts, each 
regional Sunni clergy had their own idea of how things should run.  The messages 
                                                 
52 Robinson, classroom discussion, 30 October 2006. 
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generated in Hama would directly contradict the sermons offered in Damascus.  With a 
conflicting information strategy, the population didn’t know who to follow or what to do.  
Their conflicting messages paralyzed their mobilization efforts at the most inopportune 
times, specifically February 1982.   
Another missed opportunity was the Muslim Brotherhood inability to tap into the 
international Sunni clergy.  The opportunity to be “enlightened and instructed by the 
clergy”53 was lost as the Jihadis failed to seek these religious leaders’ guidance.  The 
religious leaders felt marginalized and went into their own “self-imposed seclusion”54 
ignoring the struggle of the Mujahideen.  In both cases of failing to harness the domestic 
and international support of a unified Sunni clergy, the opportunity to gain “religious 
legitimacy”55 was lost.  This moral high-ground was key terrain in the information 
operation spectrum and a crucial loss. 
Reviewing the four main aspects of the mobilizing structures, the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood’s organization had fatal flaws.  The regional disunity between the different 
hubs of the Brotherhood prevented the creation and execution of a unified strategy.  The 
de-centralized strengths of the network structure were not utilized. Instead, an ill-fitting 
centralized leadership approach by exiled leaders in Jordan and Iraq failed to address 
what was actually happening on the Syrian street.  Without the necessary logistical 
support and a unified Sunni effort, the Brotherhood was hamstrung from achieving the 
high level of success critical to defeat an entrenched authoritarian ruler.     
C.  CULTURAL FRAMING 
Though the mechanism to “get the message” out was limited by infighting and a 
lack of unity, there were clear themes that captured the ideology of the Syrian Sunni 
population.  There were easily identifiable slogans56   that played right to the heart of the 
problems experienced by the majority Sunni population. In most cases, these concepts did 
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make their way to all corners of the Syrian Sunni world without the benefit of the state-
run media.  The three main messages were: 1. The Syrian majority is Sunni, not Alawite, 
“Down with the Colonial puppets!”57  2.  Muslim Rule58, 3. Revolution is Achievable 
(the Iranian example)- Pan-Islamic nationalism is right for the Islamic world.   These 
three messages were an easy sell to the non-represented Sunni majority in Syria.  These 
messages, as they are individually analyzed, were quite powerful and described a Syrian 
society ripe for change. 
1. The Syrian Majority is Sunni, Not Alawite 
Before Syrian independence, the Alawites were favored by the French colonists 
during their reign in the region.  Under colonization, the Sunnis were treated like second 
class citizens.   When the French left, the Alawites inherited powerful positions in the 
Syrian government and military. The Assad regime replaced almost all key Sunni 
governmental workers with minority Alawites.  It became clear that Assad did not trust 
the Sunni population.  By the late 1970’s, Assad’s security forces regularly jailed, 
tortured, and killed those Sunni Syrians involved in opposing his rule. This obvious 
attack on the Sunni majority demonstrated that the Sunni majority were second class 
citizens in Syria despite their clear population advantage. 
For the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, this was an easy slogan to capitalize on.  The 
Brotherhood painted the picture that these Alawites were nothing but corrupt tyrants, 
much like their previous Western occupiers.  This was another example of a minority 
using the majority for its own gain.59  Much like the colonial times, someone else had all 
of the riches while the Syrian Sunni majority suffered. 
The expansive economic growth of the early 1970s transformed Syria’s economy 
and created a “new rich” class of Syrian citizen.  Since the Alawites were controlling the 
country, they made up a majority of these new millionaires, many of which grew up poor 
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in shanty apartments with no cars.60  This drastically changed the social dynamics of 
many social circles.  “Men whose self-esteem was rooted in the old quarters of the cities 
where life had not changed for generations found themselves devalued and uprooted….all 
seethed with resentment.”61  It was easy for the Brotherhood to capitalize on the idea that 
the Assad regime and its Alawite members were all corrupt.  The Alawites were rich at 
the expense of the Sunni majority who endured poverty and all of its trappings.  This 
perceived injustice proved to be a “cultural framing” rallying cry for the Muslim 
Brotherhood. 
The Pan-Arabist’s promises had failed.   As was mentioned in the political 
opportunity structures, the two main promises did not improve the living conditions of 
the majority of Syrians.  As people were force to live “hand to mouth” from the 
government, it became an easy theme for the Brotherhood to highlight and show the 
moral bankruptcy of the inept and corrupt secular Assad regime.  “Down with the 
Colonial Puppets” was an easy slogan to voice, especially when the proof surrounded the 
target audience’s daily life. 
2. Muslim Rule 
Much like other Islamist movement’s slogan, “Islam is the solution”62, the secular 
vs. Islamic rule argument is upfront in the Brotherhoods Information Operations (IO) 
campaign.  Sunni Islam is a readily available network that connects a majority of the 
population.  It is commonly understood that if Allah’s will is achieved, Allah bestows 
worldly success upon his Muslim people.63  This idea goes back to Ali’s Caliph and its 
amazing success dominating most of the known world.64  (It would be the modern day 
equivalent of the Congo beating all of the world’s current superpowers.)  The reverse is 
                                                 
60 Patrick Seale, Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkley, University of California Press, 
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61 Seale, 321. 
62 Robinson, 131. 
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true as well.  If the Muslims fail to meet Allah’s expectations, then they will suffer 
worldly defeat.  The Muslim Brotherhood highlighted that while under colonization and 
secular rule, the Syrians suffered.  This was due to the failure to live a good Islamic 
lifestyle and meet Allah’s will.  To get back worldly success, Shari’a law was the 
solution.  Therefore, “Muslim Rule” was an appropriate slogan to sell to the population.   
The inherent problem in this message was creating a unified idea for all of the 
Islamic opposition groups to rally around.  Different interpretations of “Muslim Rule” 
confused the Syrian population with numerous, sometimes contradictory, messages.  In 
many instances, the “Muslim Rule” message was massaged to fit the regional priorities of 
the opposition group and / or clergy’s particular priorities.  When these specific messages 
were exported to other regions with opposite ideas, the message became confused and 
lost.  For example, some regional hubs that relied on support from Saddam Hussein 
claimed Saddam and his Ba’athist regime were “True Muslims”.  Other groups saw 
Saddam as a secular infidel and felt that no support should be received from his apostate 
regime.65  These issues were practically impossible to resolve as the argument revolved 
around an individual’s particular faith and beliefs.  Therefore, these crevasses were not 
bridged and unity on the “Muslim Rule” concept wasn’t achieved.  This is another 
explanation why the Syrian masses were not properly mobilized.  
3. The Revolution is Achievable (Iranian Model) 
By late January 1979, the Muslim Brotherhood’s fight against the Assad Regime 
was steadily increasing as the Iranian Shia overthrew the Shah’s government.  The 20 
month period following the Iranian revolution was the equivalent, in poker terms, of the 
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood going “all in”.  The example set by the Iranian revolution 
showed all other Islamic fundamentalist movements that success was achievable. 66   
With the region in a perceived state of disarray, the Islamic fundamentalist capitalized on 
this momentum.  In the months following the Iranian revolution, the Brotherhood 
attacked the artillery school in Aleppo killing 83 cadets, attempted to assassinate 
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President Assad in an audacious ambush, and attempted to execute a coup de’ tat within 
the Syrian Military which was thwarted before it started.  The Brotherhood felt the time 
to strike was at hand and made their revolutionary move.  Unfortunately for the 
Brotherhood, the Assad regime saw what was at stake and proved that their willingness to 
stay in power had few limitations. 
These three messages were strengths for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.  They 
had a “moral high ground” to mobilize their masses for a higher cause.  How these 
messages failed to reach their target audience was not due to cultural framing, but in the 
mobilizing structure of the Brotherhood.  The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological 
disunity and poor strategy neutralized the power of the messages found in the cultural 
framing.  These messages are still valid today as the Assad regime (albeit his son, 
Bashar) is still an authoritarian oppressive minority government and a majority of Syrians 
are still Sunnis.  While Pan-Arabism has failed the region, Pan-Islamism still has yet to 
be tested.   
D.  CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, SMT offers an excellent tool to create a case study of the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood from 1977 to 1982.   It is clear that the Assad regime’s absolute 
intolerance of the Muslim Brotherhood forced the Brotherhood to transform itself from a 
loose social network into a violent revolutionary movement.  In the Brotherhood’s mind, 
there was no left alternative left except revolution.   
Through SMT, the 1977-1982 Brotherhood is revealed as a series of regional 
networks that were not bound together by a coordinate strategy or charismatic leader.  
These regional hubs were defined by internal power struggles and individual priorities 
preventing them from assimilating into a greater network with the other hubs.  The top 
leadership was an exiled group of elites attempting to control the tactical fight from 
Jordan and Iraq while the field commanders were beholden to their international 
logistical flow.  The political opportunities and the cultural framing variables supported 
the idea of Syrian revolution, but the Brotherhood could not convert those variables into 
success. 
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The numerous vulnerabilities exposed in this chapter are crucial to note as the 
next chapter explores how Assad applied extreme state violence to defeat the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  In Chapter 5, the 1977-1982 SMT case study will be compared to Chapter 
4, a SMT case study of the 1995-present Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.  It is clear from 
this analysis that the cause of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood transformation from a 
violent revolutionary social movement to a peace oriented social movement was due to 
the harsh authoritarian tactics employed by the Assad regime.  Using this model, there are 
significant counter-insurgency possibilities for contemporary States in their relationship 
with violent Islamic revolutionary groups throughout the Middle East.   
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III. SYRIA’S APPLICATION OF EXTREME STATE VIOLENCE 
The question of how Assad applied extreme state violence is analyzed in this 
chapter.  It demonstrates how Assad defeated the Brotherhood and completely annihilated 
the social movement outlined in chapter 2, leading to the pacification of the Muslim 
Brotherhood during its re-emergence beginning in the late 1990s.   What was the role of 
this extreme state violence in the evolution of the Brotherhood?  
In February 1982, Assad’s Syria crushed the Muslim Brotherhood.  The two 
fundamental questions are: “Why did the Assad Government succeed?” and “Why did the 
Brotherhood fail?”  A useful counter-insurgency (COIN) model to analyze these 
questions is the Mystic Diamond framework67 which looks at the various relationships 
between the population, the insurgency, the government and the international community.  
The answer to success and failure can be found in how these numerous entities interacted 
with each other.  In this case, the Syrian population is the indigenous population, the 
insurgency is the Muslim Brotherhood, the Government is Assad’s regime, and the 
international community is all of the other countries outside of Syria.  It is important to 
note the space between the entities in Exhibit 1 (The Mystic Diamond) as that represents 
the “political space” which must be controlled to achieve success in insurgency and 
counter-insurgency operations.  For the insurgency, the following strategies must be 
addressed to achieve success: 
The 5 Counter-State strategies are: 
1.Counter-state affecting the population 
2.Counter-state affecting the political space 
3.Counter-state affecting the State 
4.Counter-state affecting the state's relationship with the international community 
5.Counter-state affecting the international community68 
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For the State to be successful, the following strategies must be accomplished to 
defeat the insurgency: 
The 5 State strategies are:  
1.State affecting the population 
2.State affecting the political space between the Counter-state and the population 
3.State affecting the counter-State 
4.State affecting the counter-state's relationship with the international community 
5.State affecting the international community 
 
The McCormick Mystic Diamond Model: 
 
Figure 3.   Dr. McCormick’s Mystic Diamond Model 
 
An important factor in the Mystic Diamond is that all of the entities and the 
political space between them are related and interdependent.   To be successful, the state 
or counter-state needs to control all of the entities and their various relationships 
(political space) with other entities.  For example, if the counter-state can break the 
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relationship between the state and the population, then the counter-state can control the 
population.  While the counter-state undermines this relationship, the counter-state is 
building their relationship with the population.  Using the Mystic Diamond model to 
analyze the Syrian Muslin Brotherhood insurgency, the answers to the Assad 
government’s success and the Brotherhood’s failure are understood. 
A.  THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE MYSTIC DIAMOND 
Using the Mystic Diamond framework, the Muslim Brotherhood’s insurgency is 
analyzed to determine where it failed in its strategy to overthrow the Assad regime. 
 
Figure 4.   The Muslim Brotherhood’s Mystic Diamond 
 
The Five strategies that the model analyzes are: 
1.The Muslim Brotherhood affecting the Syrian population 
2. The Muslim Brotherhood affecting the Syrian political space 
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4. The Muslim Brotherhood affecting the Regime's relationship with the 
international community 
5. The Muslim Brotherhood affecting the international community 
1. The Muslim Brotherhood Affecting the Syrian Population 
If the state provides the basic needs for the population, the Islamic groups need to 
be in a position to assume those responsibilities immediately.  Failure to accomplish this 
would create a serious backlash and cripple the opposition groups.  For example, in one 
hard-learned lesson around 1943 in Damascus, the Syrian government grew tired of the 
Brotherhood’s antics and shut down milk suppliers, stating “let them go the Sheiks for 
milk”, fully knowing the Brotherhood did not have the social services to support the 
people.  When the Sheiks couldn’t deliver, the population revolted against the Muslim 
Brotherhood.69   
The Muslim Brotherhood’s relationship with the population seemed strong due to 
a largely sympathetic audience that was over 70% Sunni Muslim.  The regime was 
loaded with minority Alawites leaving the Sunni majority largely under-represented.    
Unfortunately, the Brotherhood’s lack of unity failed to mobilize the Sunni population to 
rise up and join their insurgency when they claimed Hama as an independent Islamic 
state from Syria.  The Syrian government took advantage of the organizational flaws 
outlined in chapter 2.  At the outset of the siege of Hama, the Syrian government cut all 
telephone and telegraph lines from Hama to the outside population leaving Hama 
isolated.  Once isolated, the Brotherhood had no mechanism to mobilize the Syrian Sunni 
population to save the city70.   The Brotherhood’s exiled leadership command and control 
mechanism was not responsive enough to coordinate a Syrian Sunni uprising across the 
country.  Therefore, the Brotherhood lacked the ability to control a country-wide 
insurgency in 1982.  The Sunni population was not mobilized and the Brotherhood in 
Hama was forced to fight the entire Syrian security apparatus alone.  This flawed 
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organizational structure proved to be the critical vulnerability that led to their defeat.   
Assad’s forced capitalized on this structural failure and exploited the weakness, isolating 
the Brotherhood and destroying it piece by piece. 
2.  The Muslim Brotherhood Affecting the Syrian Political Space 
For the Muslin Brotherhood to be successful, it needed to break the regime’s 
control over the Syrian population while exerting their control over the population.  
While they were able to accomplish this in the historical Sunni strongholds of Hama and 
Aleppo, they could not accomplish this in Damascus and the rest of the country.  This 
was partly due to the tight control exerted by an authoritarian government and the 
aforementioned inability of the Brotherhood to organize as one united revolutionary 
organization.  The government had free reign to repress, bribe, and threaten anyone to 
maintain control.  To convince others to stand up to such repression meant putting 
individual’s lives and the lives of their family in great jeopardy.  Many Syrians were not 
ready to make such a sacrifice in an unclear political environment defined by fear, 
violence, and repression.   
The Brotherhood failed to develop a rural infrastructure.  There existed an entire 
untapped resource of rural Sunni Muslims that could have transported logistics, exploited 
rural areas for combat sites, and acted as effective communicators.71  The Brotherhood let 
itself get surrounded by only developing the urban areas.  In a sense, they became virtual 
“urban islands” that were easily controlled by the military and police. This highlights the 
aforementioned poor or non-existent mobilization and command and control strategy. 
3. The Muslim Brotherhood Affecting the Assad Regime 
The tactics used by the various opposition groups were gang-land style hit and run 
tactics that did not adapt to the changing pace and scope of operations in Syria. Though 
they were initially effective, they were not able to evolve as the fight grew larger than the 
basic urban street battle.  This is due to the limited time and resources spent in training 
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the individual insurgent.  To compound the problem, the hubs that controlled these cells 
were ruled by committee which failed to reach a unified consensus on how to fight the 
government.  Ultimately, this type of “tit for tat” warfare became a war of attrition.  The 
well oiled Syrian military and effective secret police network was much better prepared 
for this type of fight.  The Syrian government adapted their tactics overtime to optimize 
their results while the Brotherhood failed to evolve.  In the end, this tactical advantage 
rested solely with the Syrian government. 
The Muslim Brotherhood was no match militarily for the Syrian armed forces.  
Before they moved to conventional combat operations in Hama, the Brotherhood used 
their insurgent strengths (stealth, bombings, assassinations, and other covert operations) 
to fight the larger enemy.  As noted earlier, they attempted to assassinate President Assad 
but failed.  This decapitation attempt was their best chance to defeat the Assad regime.  In 
retrospect, it was a terrible miscalculation to try to fight the Syrian military in a 
conventional fight in Hama.   It highlighted the Brotherhood’s lack of understanding of 
their enemy, specifically Assad’s will to stay in power and willingness to use the military 
in a “total war” manner.   It also shows the Brotherhood’s lack of self-awareness by 
going to the conventional fight when it was not prepared to win a war.  The Brotherhood 
lost everything due to these strategic mistakes. 
4.  The Muslim Brotherhood Affecting the Regime's Relationship with 
the International Community  
As previously mentioned, Syria enjoyed the support of the Soviet Union while the 
Soviet’s enemy, the US, was mired in other international issues.  The Muslim 
Brotherhood was not equipped to attack Syria’s international ties with their allies.   Under 
Stalin, the Soviet Union had written the book on repression as a tool for domestic policy. 
Though some Soviet advisors were assassinated by the Brotherhood, it had no impact on 
the Soviets’ support of Syria.  The Syrians continued to buy weapons, tanks and airplanes 
from the Russians and used those items to repress the Brotherhood and other opposition 
parties.  The increased lethality of these arms enabled Assad’s forces to slaughter 
thousands of Syrians in Hama in February.   
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5.  The Muslim Brotherhood Affecting the International Community 
Unfortunately for the Brotherhood, there was not a “Moscow Center”72 for 
Islamists.  No one unified international power-base existed for the Brotherhood to tap 
into for total support.  The Brotherhood relied heavily on like-organizations in the region 
for support.  Organizations like Yasir Arafat’s Fatah provided weapons, training, money 
and other types of support to the Brotherhood73 . Many other Muslim Brotherhood 
organizations provided material and economic support though these outside sources 
tended to be erratic.74  Also, the sources were not tied into the operational and strategic 
plan for the Brotherhood.  Therefore, when the Brotherhood evolved into a conventional 
force in Hama, it failed to forecast the great increase of funds needed to support a larger 
conventional force.  This increase created a larger operational signature Operational 
security was reduced as funds and logistics were increased to try to support the growing 
insurgency.  This failure highlights the poor strategy adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood 
and their inability to adequately forecast for future needs and operations. 
Overall, the Mystic Diamond model’s five strategy points highlight serious 
deficiencies in the Brotherhood’s strategy.  The inability of the Muslim Brotherhood to 
maximize its available resources ( no unified message, no synchronized organizational 
structure, poor recruitment, poor mobilization, a lack of  training, inconsistent funding, 
and failing to use rural operations) prevented the Brotherhood from reaching its potential 
military power. That said, insurgencies are extremely complicated and rarely successful.  
The onus is on the insurgent group to take away the existing political space from the 
government.  The Muslim Brotherhood failed to accomplish this task.    
B.  THE ASSAD REGIME AND THE MYSTIC DIAMOND 
Using the Mystic Diamond framework, the Assad regime’s success is analyzed to 
identify what the regime did correctly to defeat the insurgency.  As in the Muslim 
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Brotherhood example, the five Mystic Diamond strategies are applied to the Assad 
regime’s COIN strategy. 
The Five strategies that the model analyzes are: 
1. The Assad regime affecting the Syrian population 
2. The Assad regime affecting the Syrian political space 
3 The Assad regime affecting the Muslim Brotherhood 
4. The Assad regime affecting the Muslim Brotherhood's relationship with the 
international community 
5. The Assad regime affecting the international community 
1.  The Assad Regime Affecting the Syrian Population 
When Assad took power in 1970, he took the existing control mechanisms (secret 
police, military) and made them stronger.  From 1970-1982, he met the challenges of his 
political opponents and retaliated with equal or greater force.  While the regime’s 
reactions to Brotherhood attacks were brutal and managed to alienate numerous Syrians, 
the government maintained positive control of the political space throughout most of the 
country. (The exceptions were the northwestern section of the country, specifically 
Aleppo and Hama.) Unlike his Ba’athist counterpart in Iraq, Assad used bribes and favors 
before turning to violent measures.   In this way, he was able to control the mid level 
Sunni merchants and businessmen that were quick to take a favor or a bribe in support of 
the Assad regime.75  However, when Assad felt an opposition group was becoming too 
powerful, he immediately closed it down.  In implementing his domestic policies, Assad 
offered some carrots, but definitely knew how to utilize the stick. 
2.  The Assad Regime Affecting the Syrian Political Space 
On the political front, the government took away the Brotherhood’s legitimate 
representation in government and made any allegiance to the Brotherhood punishable by 
death.  This made the average Syrian pick between supporting the government and 
supporting an organization that could lead to their death.  For the average Syrian with a 
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family, joining the Brotherhood in the late 1970s- early 1980s was not a very attractive 
option.  The Assad regime made a point of leaving visual reminders of their control in the 
form of executed suspected Brotherhood members on the street.  While the gruesome 
spectacle alienated some of the population, it was a visceral reminder that there was a 
cost to opposing the government.  These hard tactics coupled with a police state 
“paranoid mentality” kept a firm grip on the political space for most of the country.    
 
 
Figure 5.   The Assad regime’s Mystic Diamond 
 
3.  The Assad Regime Affecting the Muslim Brotherhood 
The Syrian government did an excellent job of containing the Muslim 
Brotherhood to urban centers throughout the country.  (This was facilitated by the 
Brotherhood’s organizational structure outlined in the last chapter.)    The brotherhood’s 
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conquer strategy that ruthlessly eradicated the Brotherhood.  This “strategy of 
concentration”76 allowed the Syrian forces to focus all of their combat and police power 
on one area at a time.  The Brotherhood’s complete annihilation in Hama was a direct 
result of this strategy. 
The Assad regime showed a very strong will in its dealings with its opponents, 
specifically the Muslim Brotherhood.  Time and again, the Brotherhood underestimated 
the sacrifices that the Assad regime was willing to absorb to impose its political will.  It 
routinely raided homes, razed mosques, and executed suspected Muslim Brotherhood 
members in Aleppo and Hama.  From the research, it seemed that there was little that 
Assad wouldn’t do to maintain is regime. Recognizing this in retrospect, the task of the 
insurgents to overthrow the government became even more challenging.  The Muslim 
Brotherhood wasn’t fighting a “paper tiger” government; they faced a committed 
authoritarian government willing to do whatever was necessary to maintain power. 
4.  The Assad Regime Affecting the Muslim Brotherhood's Relationship 
with the International Community 
The Muslim Brotherhood received some aid from sovereign countries that 
opposed the Assad regime, specifically Iraq  As previously mentioned, they relied heavily 
on foreign based organizations like Fatah and other Muslim Brotherhood factions outside 
of Syria for weapons, training, and money to support their insurgency.  However, as the 
Brotherhood grew and began to move towards conventionalizing its forces in Hama, it 
required more donations to support the growing operations.77  When money, guns and 
equipment came into the country, it brought with it the risk of compromise.  This risk was 
a critical factor in the late 1970s-early 1980s as the pressure from the government became 
overwhelming.  Assad’s forces intercepted shipments, thoroughly interrogated their 
prisoners, and used the information to unravel the Brotherhood’s revolutionary network. 
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5.  The Assad Regime Affecting the International Community 
As previously discussed, the Syrian government enjoyed the military support of a 
world superpower, the Soviet Union.  There was little resistance to Syria’s internal 
domestic polices by the international community.  For the most part, the world was 
watching Iran, the Soviet military in Afghanistan, and the Israel-Palestine -Arab 
situations.  Internal domestic strife was commonplace in other Arab countries like 
Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq to name a few.  Syria was not a unique international 
issue.  Because of this, the Assad regime was left to deal with its domestic struggles with 
little resistance from the West. 
C.  CONCLUSION 
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was crushed for two reasons: 1. a weak insurgent 
strategy and organizational structure that failed to anticipate both their evolution to 
conventional operations and the forceful government response to insurgent actions, and 2. 
the absolute command of Assad over his government, military, and his will to do 
whatever was necessary to preserve his reign.  In the volatile environment that was the 
Middle East in the late 1970’s-early 1980’s, President Assad understood the threat posed 
by the Muslim Brotherhood.   Assad knew he was locked in a zero sum game with the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Assad’s clear security vision and counter-insurgency strategy were 
understood by his forces.   The Muslim Brotherhood had a daunting task of overthrowing 
an entrenched authoritarian government.  The Brotherhood was unable to develop a clear 
strategy that mobilized the Sunni Muslim population majority, provide immediate 
military goals to mobilized forces, and long range plans for a future Islamic government.  
Without a defined insurgent strategy, the insurgency was doomed to fail.  The result was 
thousands slaughtered, an insurgent Muslim Brotherhood crushed and exiled, and an 
Assad regime (Hafez’s son, Bashar, is the current President) that continues to rule Syria.   
The goal of this chapter was to analyze how Assad applied overwhelming 
violence against the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.  The question that will be answered in 
the next two chapters is how this application of overwhelming force changed the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood.   
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The results of that analysis will demonstrate how the application of extreme state 
violence by the Assad regime transformed the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood from a violent 
revolutionary social movement to a peace oriented social movement.  The Assad 
regime’s successful counter-insurgency strategy will have implications on other Middle 
Eastern states in their relationships with Islamist revolutionary groups.  This analysis also 
demonstrates a possible use of this counter-insurgency strategy by the US in Iraq. 
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IV. THE EFFECTS OF EXTREME VIOLENCE:  THE SYRIAN 
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, 1995 TO THE PRESENT 
In the aftermath of Hama, expressions of Islamist opposition to the regime 
virtually disappeared. Many men even stopped growing beards for fear of 
inviting suspicions of the intelligence services. Thousands of Islamist 
radicals fled overseas. The brotherhood's exiled leadership adapted to a 
life of communiqués and coffee shops, while those who still felt that the 
sword was more powerful than the fax machine went to Afghanistan and 
joined the global jihadist movement. The prevalence of Syrians in both the 
leadership and ranks of Al-Qaeda is second only to the Saudis, and the 
influence of their takfiri outlook is today felt in Iraq, where the entire 
Shiite population has been designated fair game for mass murder.78 
Before, religion for the regime was like a ball of fire. Now they deal with 
it like it could be a ball of light," as one Syrian Islamic scholar told the 
New York Times.79 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the effects of the Syrian state’s violent repression are 
demonstrated.  It is clear that the Muslim Brotherhood was thoroughly dismantled in the 
post-1982 era.  Its leaders were exiled or killed, its network within Syria was neutralized, 
and the Syrian population became very aware of the heavy bloody price to be paid when 
opposing the authoritarian Assad regime.  While most other countries were experiencing 
an Islamic revival, the Syrian Sunni Muslims were trying to pick up the pieces of a 
crushed Islamic dream.   
Following its victory in Hama, the Assad regime executed a shrewd policy of 
Islamification.  The policy of “True Islam” was a strategy that provided and controlled a 
moderate Islamic movement for the Syrian population.  The Assad regime (Both Hafez 
and Bashar) understood that Islamic faith was the fuel of the Islamic opposition groups.  
By taking that fuel away, they could prevent another Hama massacre and maintain 
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control indefinitely.  This also allowed them to control the Islamic information strategy in 
the Syrian Sunni community.  The proof of this strategy’s effectiveness is demonstrated 
in the near complete drop off in insurgent attacks against the Assad regime. 
This chapter will explore the effects of Syria’s use of extreme state violence post-
1982.  It will also introduce the relationship of extreme state violence and Islamification.  
The relationship between state’s extreme state violence followed by state sponsored 
moderate Islamification proved to be an effective counter-insurgency strategy.  The 
results of this strategy will be explored in this chapter. 
B.  SMT:  THE SYRIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD FROM 1995 TO THE 
PRESENT 
To understand the effects of extreme state violence on the Muslim Brotherhood, a 
comparison between the 1975-1982 Brotherhood and the 1995 to present day 
Brotherhood needs to be established.  Laying these two SMT case studies “side by side” 
will demonstrate how effective Assad’s application of extreme state violence was in 
countering the revolutionary goals of the Muslim Brotherhood.  It will also demonstrate 
how the Assad regime maintains control by “painting the government green” through is 
Islamification strategy.  The three variables of SMT (political opportunity structures, 
mobilizing structures, and cultural framing) are the right tools to analyze the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood. The results will demonstrate the effects of extreme state violence 
suffered by the Brotherhood, an analysis of current Syrian domestic policy strategies, and 
put the existing Syrian entities in a larger regional context.  It becomes clear that state 
policy can dramatically impact Jihadist responses, and that is some circumstances, 
extreme state violence can effectively pacify Jihadist reactions. 
C.  POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES  
In the last ten years, three key political opportunity structures developed that 
provided the Muslim Brotherhood with an avenue to re-emerge as an alternative to the 
existing Assad regime.  The first is the death of Hafez Assad and the subsequent 
presidency of his son, Bashar.  The second is the involvement of Western powers in 
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Syria’s neighboring states, specifically the US in Iraq and the UN’s involvement with 
Lebanon.    The third is the Muslim Brotherhood’s evolution to a peace-oriented 
democratic strategy.  These three developments provide opportunities for the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood to re-emerge as the primary political opposition group to the Assad 
regime. 
1.  The Death of Hafez and the Rise of the Bashar Regime 
When Hafez Assad died in June 2000, his son Bashar became the president of 
Syria.  Bashar inherited a Syria that had endured a secret police state highlighted by tens 
of thousands of imprisoned suspected Muslim Brotherhood members.   Bashar promised 
political reform for Syria.  As a token gesture, thousands of opposition party prisoners, 
(many of whom were Muslim Brotherhood members), were released and some exiled 
Syrian opposition members were allowed to return to the country. Unfortunately for the 
Brotherhood, Assad’s promise of reform failed and democratic reforms did not happen. 
Bashar would not give blanket amnesty to the Brotherhood and membership is still 
punishable by death (law No. 49)80.  It is very clear that the Brotherhood will not be 
welcomed back into Syria under the current Assad regime.  While the secret police 
security apparatus has loosened its grip, it continues to maintain control of the country.    
 Bashar continued his father’s strategy of Islamification.  After the Hama 
massacre, Syria spent large amounts of money building and upgrading numerous 
mosques and Islamic schools.81  The Assad regime created and encouraged a moderate 
Islamic environment that was “pro-government”.  This “greening” of the government has 
two possibilities for the Muslim Brotherhood, it can either allow them an avenue into 
Syrian politics or it will take away the Brotherhood’s constituents weakening an already 
fragile organization.  Currently, the Assad regime sees no benefit in letting the  
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Brotherhood participate in Syrian politics.  However, Bashar is not Hafez, so there is 
hope that negotiations might yield a representative government that could resemble Egypt 
or Jordan.  
2.  The New Face of the Muslim Brotherhood    
Worldwide, the Muslim Brotherhood today is not the same violent revolutionary 
organization it was 50 years ago. Much to the chagrin of many Jihadis, the Muslim 
Brotherhood now participates in most political systems and has gone “main stream”.82   
The Jihadis lament the fact that the Brotherhood is participating in many countries’ 
political processes, processes that the Jihadis feel is “takfir”.  In countries like Jordan and 
Egypt, the Brotherhood is a quantifiable political presence representing Islamic values 
with a goal of an Islamic society.   From a Jihadi’s perspective, this non-violent 
participation legitimizes these “apostate” regimes while the true path of the Jihad is 
lost.83   
In the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s case, this strategic change has come in the 
form of the National Salvation Front (NSF).  Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanouni, the leader of 
the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and former Vice-President Abdul Halim Khaddam 
created the NSF in early 2006.  Though strange bedfellows (as Khaddam held a key role 
for almost 40 years in the Assad regimes and Bayanouni was a Brotherhood Hama 
veteran), the NSF is Syria’s consolidated opposition group that encompasses the Muslim 
Brotherhood as well as many other opposition Syrian groups.   While this new face of the 
Brotherhood has yet to take a foothold in Syria, some experts believe that, if the Assad 
regime was to collapse, the NSF, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, would be the next 
organization to take control of Syria.84 
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What sets the NSF apart from the 1976-1982 Muslim Brotherhood is its 
ideological goal.  The NSF calls for a peaceful “liberal democracy”85 as opposed to the 
revolutionary Islamic republic strategy of 40 years ago.  (Also important to note: Since 
Bashar Assad’s call for political reform in 2001, the Muslim Brotherhood has made 
liberal democratic overtures in an futile attempt to become re-integrated into legitimate 
Syrian society.86)  This new strategy recognizes that a majority of the country is Sunni.  
If established, the democratic system could be utilized to establish an Islamic state via the 
Sunni majority.  This fact is not lost among the Alawites and other minorities in Syria.  
The Assad regime continues to keep membership to the Brotherhood a capital offense 
and there is no discussion of lifting the ban on the Brotherhood.  All of this said, the new 
evolution of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood exists in the NSF which opposes the current 
regime and has embraced a democratic strategy as its key to success. 
3.  Turbulent Times: the US in Iraq, the Hezbollah Tightrope, and 
Syria’s Troubles in Lebanon 
Since 2003, three events have changed the landscape of Syria’s borders, the first 
is the US war in Iraq, the second is Syria’s withdrawal of troops from Lebanon and the 
Assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri, and the third is Syria’s support of 
Hezbollah against the Israelis in 2006.  These events have put considerable amounts of 
pressure on the Syrian regime.  The US’s war in Iraq has emboldened Jihadi fighters to 
take action in Iraq via Syria forcing the Assad government to answer to the conflicting 
agendas of the Sunni majority and international pressure led by the US.  The 
assassination of Hariri has placed the UN’s crosshairs squarely on the current Assad 
regime as a full investigation is underway.  The Assad government’s support of 
Hezbollah against the Israelis in 2006 further alienated the Syrians from the US and the 
west though it bolstered its image with Islamic hardliners.  
These events have offered some strategic opportunities for the Brotherhood to 
embolden their cause.  Each of these events is extremely complicated and presents 
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numerous political opportunities for the Brotherhood to exploit to their advantage.  
Conversely, there are opportunities for the Assad regime to capture and strengthen their 
control of Syria and leverage with international affairs.   
For example, the current Iraq war provides and interesting case study.  When the 
US invaded Iraq, a deep sectarian divide surfaced between the Iraqi Shia and Sunni 
populations.  The Sunni minority found itself out of power and under attack from the Shia 
majority.  This presented a good opportunity for Sunni Jihadis to re-develop an 
infrastructure in Syria to both support operations in Iraq and possible future operations 
against the Assad regime. There was a window of time when Jihadis were moving back 
and forth across the Syrian-Iraq border and the US was beating the war drum that Assad’s 
regime could be next.87  As time went on, the Assad regime closed down many insurgent 
routes into Iraq and the US found itself completely immersed in solving the Iraq enigma.  
Only after Assad closed the border did the Brotherhood call for regime change.  By that 
point, the US war drums stopped and the Assad regime began to realize that the US was 
in no position to move into Syria.  In effect, Assad called the US’s bluff and the US 
backed down.  The Brotherhood missed an opportunity to establish a foothold and the 
window of opportunity was closed.  However, numerous Jihadis from the Iraq campaign 
are back in Syria.  They could form the core of a new Syrian Jihadi nucleus if coordinated 
correctly.88 The Iraq example shows missed opportunities but provides future 
opportunities as well. 
The other events also provided certain exploitable angles for the brotherhood to 
take advantage of to re-establish their network in Syria.   So far, the Assad regime seems 
to stay steps ahead of the Muslim Brotherhood.  After the Brotherhood called for regime 
change claiming the Assad regime didn’t care about Islam, Syria supported Hezbollah 
and appeared strong and pro-Muslim. This took away any righteous momentum from the 
Brotherhood.  The Brotherhood needs to find a way to re-connect with its Syrian Sunni 
base and push its righteous Islamic path. 
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The good news is these are volatile times in Syria.  More exploitable opportunities 
will come and the Brotherhood and the NSF need to be in a position to make the best of 
them. If done correctly, they can find a way to inject themselves back into Syrian politics 
and regain their representation.  Many other countries have incorporated the Muslim 
brotherhood in their political system (Egypt, Jordan, etc.).89   If Egypt, with its bloody 
history of fighting with the Muslim Brotherhood can accept the Brotherhood into politics, 
then there is a real hope for Syria.  This will allow them to push their new liberal 
democratic message.  The opportunities are there for the Brotherhood  to exploit. 
D.  MOBILIZING STRUCTURES 
The 1995-present Syrian Muslim Brotherhood looks nothing like its pre-Hama 
organization.  For the most part, all of the current existing Muslim Brotherhood and NSF 
leadership structures are exiled in Europe.  Determining what infrastructure and support 
networks exist in Syria is very difficult.  However, the new age of the Arab media has 
proven to be an effective tool to reach out to the Syrian street.  In this section, the 
Brotherhood’s international network will be examined as well as the role of the new Arab 
media.  From this, the current framework can be understood and the mechanisms for 
reaching their target Syrian Sunni audience understood.  This snapshot will also 
demonstrate the effects of a ruthless authoritarian government’s tactics on a revolutionary 
opposition group.  When compared to the 1977-982 Brotherhood, the contrast in the 
current Brotherhood’s mobilizing structures, location, and strategy is quite apparent.  
These are the results of extreme state violence thoroughly executed against an opposition 
group. 
1.  The Brotherhood’s Organization: the Physical Layout, the 
Leadership, and Their Strategy 
After the fall of Hama in 1982, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood crumbled.  Those 
that weren’t captured or killed fled into exile in Britain, Jordan, and Germany.  The 
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current Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s network consists of hubs in London, Germany, 
Egypt, and a new lobbyist cell in Washington DC.  These hubs represent the top 
leadership in the current organization and represent the overt face of Syrian opposition 
forces to the world.  There are no known hubs inside of Syria though evidence suggests 
many deported frustrated Iraqi fighters, unable to strike against US or Israeli forces are 
now focusing their Jihadi violent tactics against the Assad regime. 90 
 
Figure 6.   The 1995-Present Muslim Brotherhood Organization 
 
Since 1996, Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanouni has been the leader for the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood and, as of 2006, the NSF.91  Many of the previous leaders from the 
late 1970s-1982 left the organization.  Some followed their Jihadi calling and are 
members of Al Qaeda and other militant Jihadi groups.  Others lost interest in attempting 
to change an unmovable regime.  The new strategy of the NSF is to combine all existing 
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Syrian opposition groups under one umbrella of a liberal democracy and present the 
international community with an alternative to the Assad regime.  The NSF wants to 
pressure the Assad regime into letting them participate in the government like many other 
Middle Eastern countries. 
This unified front of opposition groups has faced some serious challenges.  While 
the London hub, under Bayanouni, has advocated negotiating with the current Bashar 
Assad regime, the Egyptian hub disagrees believing that Assad’s growing international 
and domestic isolation will force him to make concessions to the opposition groups.92  
The addition of Khaddam to the London NSF headquarters further alienated the Egyptian 
Brotherhood as they don’t accept Khaddam due to his past role in the Assad regimes.  
The few opposition groups that exist in Syria immediately distanced themselves from 
Khaddam.  In April 2006, the discord inside the organization went public as Deputy 
General-Supervisor Farouq Tayfur announcing his withdrawal from the NSF93.  This 
internal strife and disagreement seems reminiscent of the Brotherhood’s inability to 
coordinate their organization prior to the Hama massacre.  Until an agreed upon strategy 
can be reached, the NSF will struggle to develop a strong organizational mobilizing 
structure. 
Still, those who continue to operate under the NSF umbrella have seen some goals 
achieved.  Bayanouni has held on and off negotiations with the Assad regime.94  Some 
progress had been made in the form of prisoner releases and the return of certain exiles.  
However, Bayanouni has three core demands that have not been met.  They are a general 
amnesty that would free thousands of Brotherhood members still in detention, permission 
for all exiles to return home, and a lifting of the government's ban on the Brotherhood.95  
The current Assad regime, which has become arguably stronger in the last two years, has 
shown no signs of agreeing to these demands.96 
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2.  The Mobilizing Mechanism:  Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, and the Internet 
…the Syrian authoritarian regime is still seeking its own benefits and 
sticking to the totalitarian and wicked policies while our people are still 
suffering from all kinds of tyranny and suppression…The regime also is 
the real reason behind unemployment, ignorance, and downfall in all the 
fields: education, health, food, and medicine, because this authoritarian 
regime usurps the public money and control the power…97 
The statement detailed above is found on the Muslim Brotherhood’s well 
produced and easy to navigate web-page full of the latest Brotherhood news, press release 
statements, and a vast archive of historical documents.  The Muslim Brotherhood’s web 
page categorizes their organization by country and topic.  Unlike the 1976-1982 Muslim 
Brotherhood that relied on poorly coordinated “word of mouth” coordination, the modern 
day Brotherhood has utilized information age technology available to the most basic 
computer user.   The struggle to get a unified message out to everyone now exists; it is 
the new Arab media. 
In the last five years, the information age has dominated the Arab world.   The 
idea that the individual Arab can call in to a live TV show and challenge state-run 
policies, existing social barriers, or vent their general frustration has a far reaching impact 
on all that participate in the Middle Eastern region.98  Case and point, the Arab news 
channels, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya have made Bayanouni more than a household name; 
he is the face of the Syrian opposition.  The mechanism of an opposition lead to 
charismatically call for immediate change now exists.   This puts the Assad regime in a 
difficult position as their policies are being questioned and attacked openly by opposition 
groups outside of their own country.  If they can ever decide on one unified information 
strategy, the mechanism exists for the Syrian opposition groups to pressure the Assad 
regime.  For the Brotherhood and the NSF to be successful, they need to master the Arab 
media. 
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One of the challenges to measuring the effect of the Arab media is the lack of 
polling data available measuring the average Syrian’s feelings towards the NSF.  To 
quote one reporter living in Damascus, 
There are no public opinion polls in Baathist Syria and the movement 
(Brotherhood) has not tested its popularity by calling for demonstrations 
or strikes in two decades. Although Syrian Sunnis are more outwardly 
religious today than they were then (veiling, for example, is much more 
common), the movement no longer has a deep social support base or 
control over religious institutions.99 
The Assad regime has countered some of the Brotherhood’s media attacks by 
promoting moderate Islam and reaching out to the merchant middle-class.  There as been 
a strong push by the Assad regime to shore up support with the merchants by giving them 
economic incentives to support government policies.  Though there has been a small 
increase in violent attacks in the last three years, the Assad regime is much stronger now 
in 2007 than it was in 2004. 
3.   The Difference a Few Decades Makes… 
When looking for the effects of extreme state violence against the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood, look no further than the present organizational and mobilizing structure of 
the Brotherhood.  Assad’s counter-insurgency strategy scattered the Brotherhood 
throughout the world.  The Hafez Assad regime effectively ran the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood out of the country by using overwhelming violent authoritarian tactics 
followed by the establishment and control of moderate Islam.  The Assad regime’s 
strategy of becoming “meaner and greener”100 proved quite effective against the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  The proof is the vast difference between the mobilizing structures of the 
two case studies.   
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E.  CULTURAL FRAMING 
The last decade has been tumultuous for Syria.  The death of Hafez Assad and the 
rise of his son Bashar, the emergence of the new Arab media, the US war in Iraq, the 
Syrian issues with Lebanon and Hezbollah are only some of the dynamic events that have 
affected Syria.  From these events, key ideas and slogans present themselves for the 
Brotherhood to use to in their effort to gain the support of the Syrian population. The 
three main themes that the Brotherhood and NSF promote are the failures of an 
ineffective and corrupt secular Bashar Assad regime, Islam is the solution, and the way 
ahead is liberal democracy and peace.  By hammering away at these three central 
messages, the Brotherhood hopes to set the stage for their eventual return to Syrian 
politics.  
As mentioned in the previous section, gauging the level Syrian receptiveness to 
these cultural framing messages is quite difficult as there is no independent polling 
apparatus available to measure public response.  Though the paranoid atmosphere of a 
secret police state has lessened under the Bashar regime, it still exists and maintains firm 
control of the population. 
1.  Bashar’s Corrupt Regime; Like Father, Like Son    “Remember June 
27th”  
When Bashar took power in Damascus, he promised democratic political reforms 
and the loosening of the totalitarian tactics that griped Syria.  The period from 2000-to 
early 2001 became known as “Damascus Spring”101 as many Syrians thought that real 
change could take place.  Outspoken critics of the regime began to come out against 
Assad which led to a swift government crackdown.  According to the Syrian Human 
rights watch,  
When he was sworn in as president, he introduced himself as a reform 
advocate, and many felt optimistic about this, but after months we found 
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ourselves back to square one, with the campaign of repressions and 
imprisonments being on the rise.102 
The Brotherhood points to this and says “see, he is not different than his corrupt 
takfir father.”  In a human rights report published in June 2006, it is estimated that 17000 
prisoners are still unaccounted for since the implementation of law 49 in 1980103.  Assad, 
in a desire to relieve some of this pressure, has released some token prisoners and 
allowed some exiled Syrians to return home.  Much like the government’s Islamification 
strategy, it takes momentum away from the opposition parties. 
A key slogan to take form this is “Remember 27 June”.  On 27 June 1980, Rifaat 
Assad stormed Tadmor prison and murdered 1000 Muslim brotherhood prisoners in 
response to the failed assassination attempt on Hafez Assad.  “Remember 27 June” 
carries the ideas of martyrdom and the toils of imprisonment under an authoritarian ruler.  
It is easy to rally around; much like “Remember the Alamo” or “Remember the Maine” 
was to the US.   
2.  Islam is the Solution 
 O, brave Syrian people... Since its establishment, our Group (MB) 
pledged to survive the Islamic religion Da'wa, because it is the Da'wa of 
truth, freedom, equality, security, and monotheism. MB pledged to adhere 
to the Islamic revivalist trend to rectify the creeds and stances, as well as 
resist heresy and fake traditions. MB strengthened the cultural situation of 
both life and science and to try to be strong as possible. MB backed the 
oppressed and the woman, and helped eliminate ignorance of the people 
under the umbrella of Islam… Now is the time for the nation, which 
believes in one God, one Holy Book, and follow one Prophet, to get out of 
Seffeen's sedition and Karbla's revenges…104 
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This is an excerpt from Bayanouni’s January 2006 address to the Syrian people 
and those that support the Muslim Brotherhood.  Though the Muslim Brotherhood 
encompasses all Syrian opposition groups, Bayanouni’s message is quite clear, Islam is 
the answer.  This message hasn’t changed but the methods have changed.  In 1977, the 
Muslim Brotherhood took a violent revolutionary approach to establishing a Syrian 
Islamic state and failed miserably.  The new method is through a multi-party democracy 
strategy which would work through the government versus working against it.  Examples 
of this exist throughout the Middle East and central Asia.   
As mentioned throughout this chapter, the trouble faced by the Muslim 
Brotherhood on this critical issue is the Assad government’s Islamification program.  The 
Assad government named its moderate Islamification strategy “True Islam”105.  This 
creates confusion for the average Syrian who has to figure out which Islamic teachings 
are correct.  The state has numerous “state-sponsored” clergy members with large 
congregations that support the government’s policies.  Unless the Brotherhood can 
present a case that shows how Assad’s Islamification program is false, the Brotherhood 
will have a hard time convincing its target audience, the Syrian Sunnis, that the 
Brotherhood and the larger NSF organization are the way ahead.  The Brotherhood must 
accomplish this to mobilize the Syrian masses. 
3.  The Multi-Party Liberal Democracy Approach  
The real opposition cannot be based on tyranny, despotism, suppression of 
the people, killings, or detentions; the real one should be based on the 
national unity, freedom of the people, the participation of the people in 
self- determination, and giving up tyranny and injustice. 
We are looking forward to a free world that is full of love, dialogue, and 
acquaintance and keeping away from all kinds sources of war; the most 
dangerous source is the terrorism of the powerful with their weapons 
which kill the children, women, and the aged under the ruins of their 
houses, a world in which no one monopolize the wealth and capacities.106 
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This issue demonstrates the effect of the Assad regime’s ability to dominate 
Brotherhood on the battlefield then keep them out of the game for the following decades.  
The 1977-1982 Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s goal was to violently overthrow the Assad 
regime and set up an Islamic republic.  The current multi-party democratic message of 
the new Brotherhood represents both the effects of their defeat and the evolution of the 
Muslim Brotherhood as an international organization.  Much to the Jihadi’s chagrin, the 
Muslim Brotherhood has changed its strategy over the last decade to a peace oriented 
political approach as a means for Islamic change.  The Syrian Muslim brotherhood, now 
the NSF, is no different.   
Most minority groups in Syria are very wary of this idea.  Since a majority of the 
country is Sunni, having a democratic form of government will leave the other minorities 
out of the political running.  This is especially true with the Alawites as they have ruled 
Syria with a heavy hand for many decades.   The Alawites have nothing to gain from a 
multi-party democracy and everything to lose.  Therefore, Assad has no reason to change 
his form of government to support a Sunni heavy democracy and every reason to keep his 
authoritarian regime in power. 
F.  CONCLUSION 
The comparison between the two SMT case studies demonstrates the thorough 
effectiveness of Hafez Assad’s application of extreme state violence against an 
opposition group. While the differences between the two versions of the Brotherhood will 
be explored more in the next chapter, the stark contrast in organizational concept and 
strategic goals are a testament to the power of a well executed military counter-
insurgency strategy by an authoritarian government.  Analyzing the Syrian example, 
there is validity to the state’s application of state violence against its own people and 
opposition groups as a viable counter insurgency strategy.  Of course, there is a 
considerable moral and ethical argument against these violent tactics.  That said, the 
proof of extreme state violence as an effective counter-insurgency strategy is proven by 
the Assad regime’s ability to maintain power for 40 years while the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood is in disorganized exile. 
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The final chapter explores the relationship between the state’s use of extreme 
violence and the role of Islamification.  The “meaner and greener” counter-insurgency 
strategy was validated in Syria’s war with the Muslim Brotherhood.  This counter-
insurgency strategy has not had the same effects in other countries such as Egypt.  What 
will be determined is why this happened in Syria and how this model can be applied to 
future conflicts.   
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V.  ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS  
The use of extreme state violence by the Assad regime effectively defeated the 
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s insurgency.  This was a direct result of Syria’s ability to 
violently exploit the organizational weaknesses of the Brotherhood. This answers the 
thesis questions of “Does the state matter?” and “How does the state’s use of extreme 
violence affect opposition groups?”    Extreme state violence was only one phase of 
Assad’s strategy. After analyzing the present day Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, it becomes 
clear that the Islamification phase played a critical role in controlling the Syrian people.  
It took the religious moral argument away from the religious opposition groups while 
placating the Sunni majority with a moderate, albeit state-controlled, Islamic 
environment. This “meaner and greener” strategy107, the combination of the state’s 
application of extreme state violence and Islamification, is not unique to the Syrian 
experience, as other countries have used variations of this strategy.  That said, this 
strategy was the most effective in the Syrian example.  It is important to note that this 
strategy is not applicable in most counter-insurgency situations in which the State’s use 
of extreme violence is insufficient to end an insurgency.  The reason for the success of 
this strategy is found in the conditions that determine Syria’s identity and the critical 
organizational flaws of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.    
A.  SYRIA’S IDENTITY: WHY “MEANER AND GREENER” WORKED 
The success of the Assad regime is as much about Syria’s identity as its counter-
insurgency strategy.  Syria’s history reflects a country consistently ruled by outside 
empires (Mongols, Ottomans, and French to name a few).  Syria’s opportunity for its own 
independent identity finally came in 1946.  Between 1946 and Assad’s rise to power in 
1970, Syria’s history has been a series of schizophrenic tribal clashes and power struggles 
with no unifying historical bond for the individual Syrian to rally around in times of 
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struggle.  No “Jeffersonian Society”108 has existed to bring the Syrian people together for 
a common cause.  Assad’s authoritarian rule was the powerful force that forged the 
current Syrian identity. 
Prior to the Assad regime, the question of Syrian identity varied from region to 
region.  In Aleppo and Hama, the Syrian’s identified with strong independent Sunni 
characteristics.  In the seats of power in Damascus, there is a strong Alawite identity. In 
the northeastern Al Hasakah Governorate, it was primarily Kurdish with a strong Kurdish 
identity.    The Assad regime succeeded in unifying these various tribes and unique 
cultures under one authoritarian government.  By providing one powerful force, order 
was established and maintained among the various diverse regions.  The “meaner” phase 
demonstrated to every tribe and culture the heavy price to be paid for opposing the Assad 
regime.  The “greener” phase pulled the fractious pieces back together under a moderate 
Islamic umbrella.  By demonstrating its power and applying a unifying solution, the 
Assad regimes sold the Syrian population a successful strategy that has ensured four 
decades of unbroken rule. 
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s flawed insurgent organization was critical to 
the success of the “meaner and greener” strategy. The uncoordinated strategy of the 
Brotherhood pre-1982 was a key element to Assad’s success.   The Brotherhood’s 
inability to mobilize a unified revolutionary organization allowed Assad’s experienced 
security apparatus to exploit the Brotherhood’s organizational vulnerabilities.  Once the 
organization was shattered and its survivor’s exiled in the “meaner” phase, the Assad 
regime was able to mold the Syrian Islamic environment through the “greener” phase. 
After Hama, insurgent attacks against the government dropped off to practically nothing 
which demonstrated the effectiveness of this strategy.  Since then, the government has 
maintained a tight control over the Syrian political space which continues today.    
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B.  WHEN TO APPLY ASSAD’S COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY  
The “meaner and greener” strategy has specific application criteria.   Many 
Middle Eastern countries would not meet the criteria due to their varied histories and 
identities.  Using the Jordanian and Egyptian examples, neighboring Jordan has been 
ruled by a constitutional monarchy since 1952 while Egypt was a monarchy then, after a 
coup in 1952, became a republic.  Each country’s history has forged a separate and 
unique identity.  After their 1967 defeat at the hands of Israel, Egypt unsuccessfully tried 
a version of the “meaner and greener” strategy to eradicate the Muslim Brotherhood.  In 
many cases, it seemed to embolden the movement.  After some tumultuous decades, the 
Muslim Brotherhood is a full participant in Egyptian politics winning 88 seats in the 2005 
parliamentary elections.109  Unlike Egypt and Syria, Jordan has always had an open 
relationship with the Brotherhood, incorporating it in its politics as a political party.  
Therefore, the “meaner and greener” strategy does not apply as the conditions there are 
not the same as in neighboring Syria.  As stated earlier, this strategy is not applicable in 
most counter-insurgency situations, especially those in which extreme state violence 
cannot defeat an existing insurgency.  Syria’s victory was as much about exploiting the 
Brotherhood’s organizational vulnerabilities as it was the application of the “meaner and 
greener” strategy. 
For the “meaner and greener” strategy to be successful, the conditions must be 
similar to Syria’s situation in the 1970s.  Some of these conditions are divided tribes and 
cultural groups, a lack of a unified state history, a strong state security apparatus, and an 
authoritarian government determined to maintain power at any cost. It is important to 
note that this is a state fighting against its population, not an occupying power in a 
foreign country.  (For example, Israel has not been able to defeat the Palestinians by 
using force.)  This allows the authoritarian government to exert extreme state violence, 
and then determine the conditions of order without a historical counter argument against 
its actions. A key condition is the state’s ability to exploit an insurgency’s organizational 
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weaknesses.  This proved a pivotal point in Assad’s ability to defeat and mold the 
Muslim Brotherhood. The application of the “meaner and greener” strategy is dependent 
on these specific conditions.  Without them, this strategy will end in failure and 
unnecessary bloodshed. 
C.  FUTURE APPLICATIONS, CAN THIS WORK IN IRAQ AND BEYOND? 
The final thesis question asks “does the Syrian model have application in 
contemporary state struggles throughout the region?”    The current Iraq situation 
provides an interesting example.  Prior to the US invasion in 2003, Saddam Hussein ruled 
through a variation of this strategy.  It is possible that the “meaner and greener” strategy 
could be implemented with a degree of success.  Some of the necessary conditions exist.  
There are divided tribes and cultures and a history of order under previous authoritarian 
rulers.  The missing conditions are a strong authoritarian ruler and an effective state 
security apparatus.  Also, this needs to be a strong Iraqi authoritarian government 
exploiting the fractured nature of the Iraqi insurgent groups spread throughout the 
country, not a US / foreign led effort.  The current fractured organizational structures of 
the various insurgent groups would lend well to the “meaner and greener” strategy.    
Currently, the US backed policy focuses on a democratic power sharing government.  If 
this fails in the long term, the critical question is “would the Iraqis prefer an authoritarian 
ruler or continue to fight the fitna (discord-disharmony)110 of life in a struggling 
democracy?”  Most Iraqis don’t want another psychopathic tyrant like Saddam Hussein.  
But what about a “Hafez Assad-like” leader who lead with the carrot before he employed 
the stick?  To paraphrase the Arab saying, “Better 100 years of authoritarian order versus 
one day of fitna.”111  It might be a worthwhile exercise for the US to explore the Arab 
mindset and incorporate it into their future Middle East policy.  Though “meaner and 
greener” may not be the ideal solution, a variation of it would be worth considering, 
especially if conditions in Iraq deteriorate and threaten the future stability of the Middle 
East. 
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D.  THE BUTCHER’S BILL: MORAL AND ETHICAL CONSEQUENCES 
The “meaner and greener” strategy has significant negative moral and ethical 
consequences.  In Syria’s case, tens of thousands of Syrians died to defeat the escalating 
fitna and ensure order.  Additional tens of thousands are still imprisoned or missing due 
to this brutal strategy.112  In Iraq’s case, the toll is even higher.  Waging war against a 
state’s own citizens comes with an unimaginably heavy price.  This strategy should be 
held as a last resort.  The need for order would have to outweigh the slaughter of 
thousands of a state’s population.  The situation to utilize this strategy would be 
extremely chaotic and grave. 
 In Assad’s case, the war with the Muslim brotherhood escalated over the better 
part of a decade and evolved into the zero sum game that ended at Hama.  In 1970, Assad 
could not have predicted or imagined that he would surround Syria’s fourth largest city 
and level it.  By 1982, Assad felt he had no other choice.  In his mind, Syria’s identity 
was at stake and an all out war against the Muslim Brotherhood was the only option left.  
It was very effective and the Brotherhood was crushed.  Was the cost too high?  There is 
no clear answer.  The philosophers John Stuart Mill and Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche 
would have supported Assad’s decision while Aristotle and Immanuel Kant would have 
been horrified.113  In the end, the Syrian population decided what the right course of 
action is for their country.  If the population thought the leader went too far or failed the 
people, then they would have made changes.  In Syria’s case, the Assad family has ruled 
for four decades.   
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E.  CONCLUSION 
Syria’s use of extreme state violence crushed the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.  
Assad’s ability to violently exploit the Brotherhood’s organizational vulnerabilities 
shattered the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. The defeat forced the Muslim Brotherhood to 
reshape its organizational strategy and embrace a peace oriented democratic political 
platform.  After this war, Assad’s Islamification strategy used moderate state-controlled 
Islam to influence and control the Syrian population.   This effective use of force and 
Islamification, the “meaner and greener” strategy, proved to be a very successful counter-
insurgency plan.  The Syrian model relies on numerous specific existing conditions to be 
effective in defeating a popular revolutionary opposition movement.  This strategy is not 
the solution to most Middle Eastern revolutionary situations and can completely backfire 
if improperly employed.   With the “meaner and greener” strategy comes a heavy moral 
and ethical burden which involves war against a state’s own citizens.  This strategy 
should be employed in future circumstances as a last resort.  That said, it was an effective 
strategy for the Assad regime which continues to rule Syria. 
 The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s case is tragic for both its own 
organization and the Assad regime.  The loss of tens of thousands of Syrian lives is a 
devastating cost for any country to bear for the sake of order.  The hubris of both sides of 
the conflict is to blame.  The Assad regime’s continued persecution of the Muslim 
Brotherhood is a testament to its inability to “forgive and forget”.   Until this wound 
heals, Syria’s identity will not be whole.  Without this shared unifying identity, the 
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